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Articles

Police Brutality: Problems ,ofExcessive Force

Litigation
Sa'id Wekili*
Hyacinth E. Leus**
LET ME BEGIN BY stating what should be obvious: Nothing is more
essential to the health of our city-indeed to the very fabric of a
democraticsociety-than the integrity of our police officers. If our citizens
believe that the police are dishonest,they will be dishonest.If officersflout
the law, respectfor the law will be diminished, and the rule of law will be
eroded.'

I. INTRODUCTION

Police brutality, the abuse of authority and the use of excessive force
by law enforcement officers, is one of the significant and divisive
problems currently confronting the United States. 2 It has invoked

B.A., Pace University, 1986; M.A., Columbia University, 1989; J.D., Touro College, Jacob D.
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I.
Robert M. Morgenthau, Insuring the Ijonesty of Police Officers, 210 N.Y. L.J. 1 (July 28, 1993).
The 88.8 second videotaped police beating of African-American motorist Rodney G. King set in
2.
motion a wave of public outrage. The acquittal verdict in the first King police brutality trial triggered the worst
riots in the United States in this century, resulting in deaths, injuries, arrests, and destruction and looting of
property amounting to an estimated $1 billion. Anthony Duignan-Cabrera and Michael Connelly, The Rodney
King Affair, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at Al, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter
King Affair]. Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates was forced to resign and U.S. Attorney General Dick
Thorburgh, under pressure from African-American congressional leaders, began a review of 15,000 police
brutality complaints received by federal officials nationwide. Id. These incidents of police misconduct could cost
taxpayers millions of dollars. The Christopher Commission On Tuesday Issued A 228-Page Report On The
Activities Of The Los Angeles Police Department: Here Are Excerpts, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at A12,
available in LEmXS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter ChristopherCommission Report]. For example:

FBI Special Agent in Charge Charlie Parsons, who heads the Los Angeles office of the FBI, said as
many as 17 agents have worked full time on the investigation of the King beating since the not guilty
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continued public fervor and become a problem not easily understood or
resolved in the face of conflicting social values. Some contend there is no
problem; the use of force even in the most egregious circumstances is
justifiable because police need to protect themselves in the line of duty.3
Others concede that police brutality does exist, but only on an individual
level. Many, however, argue that police brutality is a systemic problem
evolving out of a militant police culture.5 Among this latter group are
those who contend that the problem is also racial.6 The net result has been

verdicts were handed down in state court... The Police Protective League spent about $500,000
for the officers' legal fees during the state trial.
Leslie Berger and Jim Newton, US Files Civil Rights ChargesAgainst 4 Officers in King Case, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1992, at Al, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter US Files Charges].
Police Watch has reported that, of the 2,425 complaints brought against Los Angeles police in 1991 alone,
$13 million was paid in settlement claims. Angela Oh, President of the Korean Bar Association, Race, Ethnicity
and Law Enforcement, (C-SPAN/2 television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1993). Additionally, Rodney King has rejected
a settlement offer of $1.75 million and stands a good chance at prevailing in his $50 million civil suit against
the city of Los Angeles. Linda Deutsch, King's Facial Injuries Laid to Baton Blows, L.A. TImES, Mar. 12,
1993, at BI, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
3.
D.M. Osborne, Reaching for Doubt, THE AM. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 62, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Reaching ForDoubt]. Defense counsel, for example, called Los Angeles
Police Sergeant Charles Duke, a use-of-force expert, to testify. Id. at 62. 'Duke, a 21-year LAPD [Los Angeles
Police Department] veteran charged with training police recruits, had testified that all 56 blows shown on the
videotape fell within LAPD policy (and therefore were 'reasonable' conduct for a police officer)." Id. By not
publicly denouncing this expert testimony on behalf of the LAPD as to its policy on the use of force, the LAPD
is not only tacitly condoning the beating of Rodney King, but also endorsing future episodes of similar force
in the apprehension of suspects. Id.
4.
D.M. Osborne, King Case Redux Looks Markedly Different; Feds Appear to Have Learned From
DA's Mistakes, THE AM. LAW., Mar. 17, 1993, at 1,available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File
[hereinafter King Case Redux]. The federal prosecutors, for example, 'called L.A. Police Sgt. Mark Conta, a
use-of-force expert, who stated that the beating 'clearly violated' department policy." Id.at 1. The point is that
these officers acted individually and in violation of departmental training and policy on the proper use of force.
Id.
5.
See Daniel Wise, Brutality Cases Tough to Prosecute, 207 N.Y. L.J. I (May 29, 1992) availablein
LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Tough To Prosecute] (discussing the problems which arise
during an investigation and prosecution of a police brutality allegation).
6.
Craig Wolff, Fighting Corruption;A 'Blue Wall of Reluctance' Emerges on Panel on Police Graft,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at B1, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. For example, a commission
appointed by Governor Mario Cuomo concluded in their report that 73% of those killed by white officers were
African-American or Hispanic, while 27% of those killed by white officers were white. James Barron,New York
Study of Police FindsNo Wide Misuse of Deadly Force, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1987, at Al, available in LEXiS,
Nexis Library, Newspaper File. The report further noted that some 79% of those killed by non-white officers
were minorities, while 21% were white. Id.
A public-opinion survey of 1,000 New Yorkers chosen at random, conducted by the commission, found
that only 7% identified the use of force as the issue that causes them the greatest concern, Id.The report
indicated that ethnic slurs seemed to be of greater concern. Id.
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a tremendous decline of public confidence in law enforcement and in the
judicial system for failing to adequately deter police misconduct.7
Brutality cases are often difficult to prosecute. Police who routinely
endanger their lives "to protect and to serve" are not easily reproached for
crossing the ephemeral line which separates necessary force from force
that is excessive. 8 How much discretion a law enforcement official should
exercise when drawing that line remains a source of controversy. In current
practice, police exercise broad discretion in determining what amount of
force is necessary in any given situation.
Each year a troubling number of unreasonable-force complaints
surface.9 When there is a dereliction of duties involving the use of

unwarranted force, it is also not uncommon to find such force to be
condoned without further inquiry by those groups benefitting most from
police protection. This tacit assent to police violence can result from: (1)
Lack of information about excessive force and its frequency; 0 (2)
negative racial or socio-economic stereotyping of the victim; 1 (3)
positive stereotyping of the police stemming from the desire not to

Tony Mauro, Experts,the Public Ask Why, USA WEEKEND, May 2, 1992, at 2A, available in LEXIS,
7.
Nexis Library, Newspaper File; Gail Appleson, King Verdict Shakes Faith in Jury System, REUTERS, May 2,
1992, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File; '92-Gergen & Shields; LA. Law; Boom to Bust;
,Benign Neglect?, May 15, 1992, THE MACNEILILEHRER NEWS HOUR [hereinafter MACNEILILEHRER]. The
widespread rioting which followed the acquittal of the officers in the King case is a strong indicator of the
significant breakdown of public faith in the integrity of the judicial system and law enforcement.
MACNEIIJLEHRER, supra. This is especially true in light of the fact that the public did not wait until the final
plight of the officers became clear in the judicial process. Id.
Sam Roberts, Determining How Much Force Is Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1983, at D6,
8.
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
9.
King Affair, supra note 2, at Al.
10.
Steven Lee Meyers, Outside Monitor EndorsedIn Police DisciplineEffort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993,
at B3. For example, the Mollen Commission (set up under former New York Second Department Justice and
current Deputy-Mayor Milton Mollen to conduct a probe into police misconduct) recently unearthed a police
corruption scandal in New York which involved cover-ups of police misconduct. Id. In fact, Richard L. Murphy,
the District Attorney of Staten Island, was in opposition to an outside monitor, but changed his mind after the
Mollen Commission revealed that the New York Police Department Internal Affairs unit had kept a secret file
of corruption allegations against its own officers, top police officials and their relatives. Id. The information in
those files, called "tickler files," was kept from the city's prosecutors, including Mr. Murphy, in violation of the
department's policy. Id. The question is, "Do the police have the will to police themselves? ... The answer,
when a tickler file is found, is no." Id. at B3.
See Edward J. Littlejohn, Law and Police Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 173, 177-178 (1981)
11.
(noting that police violence, by the Detroit Police Department, against minority members was reflective of the
prejudices and fears of the community at large).
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scrutinize those appointed as our guardians; 2 or (4) the desire to avoid
3
further impairing the struggle to provide effective law enforcement.
Another difficulty in prosecuting excessive force claims stems from the
close working relationship between the District Attorney's office and the
police. Inherent in that relationship is a conflict of interest, resulting from
the District Attorney's exclusive discretion to determine whether or not
to prosecute a particular case of police misconduct. 4 Further, even where
there is complete police cooperation in the investigation, there is still the
uncertainty of obtaining reliable police witness testimony. 5 Fear of
reprisal from other members of the force, a desire not to be shunned for
breaching the blue wall of silence, and the fact that there are rarely
credible witnesses to contradict police testimony, collectively create a team
mentality and provide powerful incentives to deter police-witnesses or
members of the force from cooperating in police misconduct cases.16
This Article will examine these problems in the context of two case
studies in which private citizens, Michael Stewart and Rodney King, were
beaten by police officers, one fatally, 7 the other severely.' 8 These cases
illustrate the nature of police brutality and the obstacles that private
citizens are likely to encounter if they bring brutality charges against the
police. In addition, this Article will examine the availability of feasible
options for private citizens who do bring assault charges against police
officers.' 9 Finally, this Article will conclude with suggestions on how to
remedy the types of problems encountered in excessive force litigation.2"

12.
Id.; see id. (quoting Austin Campriello, with the Manhattan District Attorney's office, who explained
that "juries see police officers as standing between them and mayhem' and are likely to believe that suspects
got what they deserved' as long as they were not killed"); id. (stating that "Iriany jurors are reluctant to
believe that officers would perjure themselves").
13.
MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 1-2 (1993)
[hereinafter AVERY & RUDOVSKYJ.
14.
Tough To Prosecute, supra note 5, at I.
15.
Id.
16.
King Affair, supra note 2, at 1;see To/gh To Prosecute,supra note 5, at 1 (quoting one Manhattan
prosecutor as saying that, "it's never easy to deal with the police department" because "they give you what
they want to give you."). A Brooklyn prosecutor added that "sometimes it is difficult to get police officers to
come forward as witnesses because of a 'code of silence."' Id.
17.
See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing the injuries inflicted upon Stewart).
18.
See infra.notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing the injuries inflicted upon King).
19.
See hifra notes 150-263 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to criminal prosecution),
20.
See infra notes 264-268 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations made by the authors
to mend the problems of excessive force litigation).

1993 / Police Brutality
II. CASE SUMMARIES

A. People of New York v. John Kostic, Anthony Piscola,
Henry Boerner,
2'
Barry
James
and
Hassler,
Susan Techky, Henry
1. The Facts
In the early morning hours of September 15, 1983, Michael Jerome
Stewart22 was standing on the L-train platform at First Avenue and 14th
Street in New York City.23 Transit Police Officer John Kostic was on
patrol in the L-train station when he encountered Stewart defacing a
subway wall.24 Officer Kostic placed Stewart under arrest and, after
cuffing Stewart's hands behind his back, escorted the young man out
through the turnstiles.25 A subsequent search of his person by the
arresting officer revealed marijuana and two envelopes containing a
substance having the appearance of cocaine.26 Thirty minutes after the
arrest, the twenty-five-year-old Stewart arrived at Bellevue Hospital

21.
All the defendants associated in this case were acquitted and the case record has been sealed, thus,
case cites are unavailable.
22.
Michael Stewart was a 25-year-old black male from Brooklyn weighing 140 lbs., wearing black pants
and shirt, and had hair fashioned in dreadlocks. M. A. Farber, Officer Swore Police Did Not Abuse Stewart, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1985, at 27, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. Stewart was a professional
model and artist. Id. He had just finished writing the letters "ROS"in large print on the subway wall of the
station and was still holding a magic marker. Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Carol Vecchione, Regional News, UPI, Sept. 28, 1983, availablein LEXlS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Michael Stewart was charged with criminal mischief, reckless endangerment, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct,
unlawful possession of marijuana and was cited for spray-painting graffiti. Id.
26.
Sam Roberts, When Police are Accused of Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at BI, availablein
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. Two envelopes of cocaine were found during a search of Stewart. Id. The
charges of cocaine possession were dropped after tests of the glassine envelopes were insufficient to undergo
chemical analysis. Id.
The Stewart incident brought to the surface many of the problems of the New York City Transit police.
Todd S. Purdum, The Subway's Police Force: Battling a PoorReputation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, at D7,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. For example, an article in the New York Times noted that:
The New York City transit police have often been branded a second-class force, and the
criticism has continued through much of the 1980"s-from the death of Michael Stewart after his
violent arrest in 1983 to the latest reports of false arrests by officers trying to improve their
performance records.
Yet since 1979 the subway police have come from the same applicant pool, taken the same
training courses and passed the same tests as have officers in the regular city force. And the city
police have had problems of their own. Just last week, two city officers were suspended on charges
of planting evidence on a drug suspect.
Id.
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Center." He was bruised, hog-tied, and comatose.28 He remained in a
coma and died thirteen days later from cardiac arrest.2 9
What took place during the thirty minutes from the time Michael
Stewart was arrested until his arrival at the hospital became the pivotal
issue in the prosecution's case-in-chief.30 While ,there was no videotape
evidence of the events that took place, a group of students in a nearby
dormitory were eyewitnesses to the events. 3 Looking out from their
windows, they saw a handcuffed black man struggling with uniformed
officers.32
An investigation resulted in the arrest of six of the eleven New York
City transit police officers who had come in contact with Michael
Stewart.33 Three officers, John Kostic, Anthony Piscola, and Henry
Boemer, were indicted on charges of criminally negligent homicide, assault
and perjury.34 The other police officers involved, Sergeant Henry Hassler,
Sergeant James Barry, and Officer Susan Techky, were indicted on charges
of perjury. 35 After the officers were indicted and charged, they each pled
not guilty, and their case gained notoriety as one of the most egregious
cases involving charges of police brutality in the history of New York
36

City.

27.
Isabel Wilkerson, Jury Acquits All Transit Officers h 1983 Death of Michael Stewart, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1985, at Al, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Jury Acquits]. The arrest
was reported at 2:50 a.m. and at 3:22 a.m. Stewart was admitted at Bellevue Hospital Center. Id.
28.
Jane Gross, Six Officers Go on Trial in Stewart Slaying Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 1985, at B4,
available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
29.
Id.; see Jury Acquits, supra note 27, at Al.; Suzanne Daley, New Study Faults Police in '83 Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1987, at Al, available in LEXis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter New Study]
(explaining the results of a released report which concluded that excessive force was used on Michael Stewart
and that officials failed to follow proper procedures).
30.
Jury Acquits, supra note 27, at Al.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. Originally all six officers were charged with assault, criminally negligent homicide, and
manslaughter. In The Matter of A Grand Jury, New York County, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 998, 999 (1984). However,
the original indictment had to be dismissed because of a grand juror's misconduct. Id. This grand juror
conducted his own investigation of the facts and shared his findings with the other jurors. Id. A second grand
jury was empaneled and testimony was heard from 62 witnesses, including pathologists hired by the victim's
family to determine Michael Stewart's cause of death, and about 40 witnesses who said they had seen officers
beating the suspect but could not identify individual officers. Jury Acquits, supra note 23, at Al. The attorneys
of record stated that, "[i]t was the first known case in the country in which an indictment was thrown out
because of a grand juror's supposed misconduct ....
"d The second indictment, which eventually led to the
trial, was returned nearly a year and a half after Mr. Stewart's death, by the second grand jury. Id.
34.
Jury Acquits, supra note 27, at Al.
35.
Id. The charges of perjury stemmed from their grand jury testimony. Id. The trial court acquitted the
officers of all charges. Id.
36.
See Isabel Wilkerson, Stewart Decision lit, The Trial Goes On Trial, N.Y. TIwES, Dec. 1, 1985, at
A47, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File (describing the Stewart case as complicated and long).
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New York County District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau made a

public statement that he believed the case was a "classic cover-up
situation. 3 7 Further, he stated that, "[w]e had all the police officers who
38
saw no evil, heard no evil. Nobody saw anybody beat up this prisoner."

District Attorney Morgenthau also pointed out that it was the first time that
an. "omission theory" 39 was being used to bring charges against police

officers.4" "What this indictment means is that when a police officer
makes an arrest, he is responsible for the prisoner in his custody. If he
beats him up or permits some other officer to beat him [up], he is now
going to be held legally responsible."41 Morgenthau said he was applying
a well-established, but rarely used, theory to ground criminal liability in
this case.42 The criminal charges were based on the theory that police
officers have a special duty to protect the rights of a suspect in their
custody, and a failure to act on that duty in their professional capacity as
police officers will give rise to criminal liability.43 In effect, the presence
of non-intervening officers at the scene signals to others (i.e., citizens or
others who may otherwise intervene) that the situation is under control and
is being handled properly. 44 Therefore, police officers have an affirmative
duty to protect a suspect in their custody from any harm.45 This duty
requires the officer in custody to arrest anyone, including another officer,
who tries to harm the suspect.46

37.
Marcia Chambers, 6 Transit Officers Indicted in Death in Graffiti Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1985,
at AI, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Graffiti Arrest].
38.
Id.
39.
Id; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (5th ed. 1979) (defining the omission theory as "[t]he neglect
to perform what the law requires. The intentional or unintentional failure to act which may or may not impose
criminal liability depending upon the existence, vel non of a duty to act under the circumstances").
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. Several cases have discussed criminal liability based on nonfeasance. See, e.g., McHenry v.
Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 188 (6th Cir. 1990); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1441 (1 Ith Cir.
1985); Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1983); Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 1983);
Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1982); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 626 (7th Cir. 1979);
Harris v. Chancelor, 537 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1976); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973);
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1972).
43.
Graffiti Arrest, supra note 37, at Al.
44.
AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 1-2.
45.
Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
46.
Id. In the Stewart case, defense counsel for the police argued that Michael Stewart was drinking and
was visibly intoxicated at the time of arrest, that his drunken state caused him to behave irrationally and to resist
arrest, and that his resisting arrest compelled the officers to forcibly restrain him. Isabel Wilkerson, Defense
Begins Its Summations In Stewart Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1985, at B3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Newspaper File. Defense counsel argued that Stewart's drunken state had resulted in his bringing injury upon
himself. Id.
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The events in the Michael Stewart case exemplify the types of
problems commonly experienced when one tries to determine whether the
arresting officer used more force than was necessary. An officer is given
broad discretion to decide how much force to use and when to refrain from
using force. 47 Often that same officer is the only witness to how much
amount of
resistance was encountered from the arrestee and whether the
48
force used was actually necessary to immobilize the suspect.

There were also questions concerning the competency of the Medical
Examiner's autopsy report.49 The facts show that hours after the death
of Michael Stewart, the Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Elliot M. Gross,
announced that there was no evidence that physical injury had caused the
death.5" After a month had passed, Dr. Gross changed his professional
opinion as to the cause of death and attributed it to a spinal cord injury,
but did not offer further evidence or explanation as to the nature or cause

Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1990). For example, the following describes the
47.
LAPD's stated policy and guidelines for the use of force:
While the use of reasonable physical force may be necessary in situations which cannot be otherwise
controlled, force may not be resorted to unless other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or
would clearly be ineffective under the particular circumstances. Officers are permitted to use whatever
force that is reasonable and necessary to protect others or themselves from bodily harm.
The Christopher Commission Report, supra note 2, at A12.
This policy guideline does not define when an alternative to the use of force would be clearly ineffective.
Nor is there a standard set forth for what constitutes reasonable force. This leaves the officer with a great degree
of discretion in determining when, and how much force to use in any given circumstance. It is this discretion
which, in the wrong hands, could potentially become a weapon of civilian oppression.
Finnegan, 915 F.2d at 823-24.
48.
Isabel Wilkerson, Dr. Gross, At Trial,Again Revises View On Cause Of Stewart's Death, N.Y.
49.
TtmEs, Oct. 5, 1985, at Al, availablein LExIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Gross at Trial]. The
Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously dismissed a libel suit brought by Dr. Elliot Gross against the
New York Times for a series of articles written in 1985 which scrutinized the competency of his handling of
the Michael Stewart autopsy. Daniel Wise, Gross's Libel Suit Dismissed; Appeals Court Rules 'Times'
Articles ProtectedOpinion, 207 N.Y. LJ. 1 (June 17, 1992), availablein LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
The Times articles quoted employees in the Medical Examiner's office and other experts in forensic medicine,
including some retained by the families of the dead persons, accusing Dr. Gross of a wide range of misdeeds,
including:
producing a series of 'misleading or inaccurate autopsy reports on people who died in police
custody,' including the highly publicized cases of Michael Stewart, who was arrested for drawing
graffiti in a subway, and Eleanor Bumpers, a public housing tenant; having issued 'unbelievably
incompetent' autopsy findings, according to one pathologist who suggested Dr. Gross was 'looking
for a way out for the police'; and removing body parts, in violation of an understanding with the
Stewart family, and handling them in a way so that potential evidence that Mr. Stewart had been
strangled while in police custody would be no longer available.
Id. Each of the four official inquiries which examined Dr. Gross's management of his office, concluded he had
not committed any crime or professional misconduct. Id. However, in October 1987, then Mayor Ed Koch
dismissed Dr. Gross as Medical Examiner. Id.
50.
Graffiti Arrest, supra note 37, at Al.
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of the fatal injury to the spinal cord."' Almost two years later, Dr. Gross
once again revised his opinion, indicating that there was evidence to
support a finding
that the cause of death could have been injuries sustained
2
in a beating.
2. The Trial
The trial began two years after the incident and lasted five months. 3
Forty-eight people took the stand to testify for the prosecution. 4 In total,
the witnesses' testimony amounted to more than 10,000 pages of trial
transcripts.Y Prosecution and defense counsel presented over 100
exhibits. 6 Among the witnesses examined were three medical experts.
Each of the three experts presented a separate theory of how Michael
Stewart died. Dr. Gross indicated that the cause of death was the result
of acute intoxication, police restraint and "blunt force trauma. ' 58 A
second expert, Dr. Brian D. Blackbone, the Medical Examiner of
Massachusetts, explained the cause of death as "force to the neck and
subsequent asphyxia."59 The third expert, Dr. Thomas B. Graboys, a
Boston cardiologist, concluded that the cause of death was the result of a
blow delivered to the chest or side. 6° The student eyewitnesses testified
concerning what they saw from their dormitory windows; however, since
their testimony was based on an incident that had occurred two years
earlier, defense counsel was able to impeach their credibility by focusing
attention on the inconsistencies between their trial testimony and the
statements they had made to the grand juries two years earlier.6t

51.
Id.
52.
Id. The medical examiner's testimony was crucial to all aspects of the case. Id. The conflicting
testimony concerning the actuial cause of Michael Stewart's death compelled the prosecution to espouse two
distinct theories on the cause of death. Id. The first theory proposed that a forced compression of Michael
Stewart's neck was the direct cause of his death and the second theory concluded that the extent and force of
the beatings were sufficiently severe to cause Stewart's cardiac arrest. Id.
53.
Isabel Wilkerson, JurorsTold To DisregardEmotion in Reaching Stewart Case Verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1985, at B2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Jurorstold to Disregard].
54.
Jzar Acquits, supra note 23, at Al.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
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For four hours, Judge Jeffrey M. Atlas charged the jury on the law
governing the issues of fact raised at the trial.62 He told the jury that the
officers should be found guilty if the jury found that the officers had a
legal duty to protect Michael Stewart and that the officers breached that
duty by failing to act when they had the clear opportunity to intervene and
protect Stewart.63 Further, Judge Atlas instructed the jurors that they
could find all the officers guilty of 'culpable inaction" 64 if their inaction
was sufficient to constitute accomplice liability, in effect holding each
other individually responsible for the criminal activity. 65 The judge also
instructed the jurors that, if they found that the officers were not the sole
cause of Stewart's death, the officers could still be liable for his death
despite other intervening factors, such as a pre-existing condition of the
66
victim.
The jury was comprised of ten Caucasians and two Hispanics. 67 Both
prosecutors, the six defendants, the six defense attorneys, and the judge
were white.68 The only African-American in the whole affair was the
victim, Michael Stewart. 69 On November 24, 1985, after a five-month
trial and nearly seven full days of deliberation, jury foreperson Monika
Millard Cox delivered the verdicts.70 The six defendants were acquitted
on all counts.7 The verdict and the extenuating circumstances of the trial
sparked public outrage and demand for a special investigation. 72 New
York Mayor Ed Koch and the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
President, David L. Gunn, investigated whether departmental charges

62.
JurorsTold to Disregard,supra note 53, at B2.
63.
Id.
64.
Judge Atlas explained to the jurors that they 'could convict the three officers who are charged with
criminally negligent homicide even if these defendants never touched Mr. Stewart." Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. See generallyDAN. B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw o TORTS § 43, at 29192 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the eggshell skull theory); see Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669,679 (1901) (originating
the eggshell skull theory of civil tort liability). This theory imposes a liability for any proximate damages that
result from the proscribed conduct in question. DOBBS, supra at 291-92. Therefore, if the plaintiff is plagued
by a pre-existing physical condition and that condition is exacerbated by an injury sustained as a result of
defendant's conduct, then the defendant would be responsible for the full extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
at 292; see id. (citing Schewingschlegl v. City of Monroe, 72 N.W. 7 (Mich. 1897), Watson v. Rheinderknecht,
84 N.W. 798 (Minn. 1901) and Gates v. Fleischer, 30 N.W. 674 (Wis. 1886) as authority for the eggshell skull
theory of liability).
67.
Peter Griffin and Richard Essex, Jurors in the Stewart Case Explain their Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4,
1986, at A23, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
68.
Jury Acquits, supra note 23, at Al.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
New Study, supra note 29, at Al.
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should be filed, while federal prosecutors investigated whether the officers
could be charged with civil-rights violations.73
The Stewart family subsequently brought a civil action for wrongful
death against New York City, the MTA, Dr. Elliot M. Gross, and the six
officers. The MTA agreed to settle with the Stewart. family for $1.7
million.74 Four years after the trial, the MTA released a report which
concluded that the officers involved in the Michael Stewart beating used
excessive force in restraining the suspect. 75 The report was released on
January 23, 1987, and was written by the Hon. Harold R. Tyler, a retired
federal judge hired by the MTA as special counsel to investigate the
Michael Stewart matter.76 The report was unclear as to whether the
beating was just one contributing factor in Stewart's death or whether it
was the direct or proximate cause of his death.77 However, the report
recommended that immediate disciplinary proceedings be brought against
the officers.78
The Michael Stewart case has all the indications of a departmental
cover-up: the arresting officers filed false reports, the same officers
proffered perjured testimony and the Chief Medical Examiner's testimony
was radically inconsistent.7 9 It is reasonable to conclude that cover-ups
such as these are not isolated incidents.80 Unfortunately, departmental
cover-ups not only conceal the crime in question but also severely impair
our ability to gauge the true magnitude of police misconduct cases.
The recent police beating of Rodney King is another case that raised
public consciousness about the nature and possible scope of police
brutality cases. One significant difference between the King and Stewart
cases is the existence of a videotape of the actual beating of Rodney King.
Had it not been for the secretly taped video evidence, the case of Rodney

73.
Id. Federal prosecutors conducted an investigation to see whether Mr. Stewart's civil rights had been
violated, only after the six officers were acquitted in state supreme court in Manhattan. Id. However, the United
States Attorney in Manhattan, Rudolph W. Giuliani, said that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a federal
grand jury investigation. Id.
74.
William G. Blair, Family Gets $1.7 Million For Stewart's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1990, at
B 1,availablein LEXiS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. The parents, sister, and brother of Michael Stewart would
receive $950,000 in cash and $750,000 in long-term annuities. Id. The family accepted the settlement offer and
agreed to drop all civil claims against the city, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Dr. Gross, and the
individual officers. Id.
75.
New Study, supra note 29, at Al.
76.
1l
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Graffiti Arrest, supra note 37.
80.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the interdepartmental cover-ups).

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 25
King may have never found its way to the media or the courtroom. On the
other hand, the striking similarities between the two cases are the
stereotyping of the victims, the severity of -the beatings and the subsequent
cover-ups.
B. United States of America v. Laurence 81Powell, Theodore J. Briseno,
Stacey C. Koon, and Timothy E. Wind
1. The Facts
In the early morning hours of March 3, 1991, George Holliday secretly
videotaped four Los Angeles police officers as they surrounded black
motorist Rodney Glen King,8 2 shot him with Taser darts, 3 and brutally
8
4
beat him as twenty-three other officers8 watched without intervention. 1
Viewers nationwide were shocked and outraged at the senseless beating
and at the failure of the other officers to intervene. 6 The videotape

81.
No. CR-92-686 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1993).
82.
King Affair, supra note 2, at Al. At the time of the incident, Rodney G. King was a 25-year-old black
male. Id. He was an unemployed construction worker from Altadena, California, on parole after serving a oneyear sentence for armed robbery. Id. He was pulled over by police on March 3, 1991, after allegedlyleading
the officers on a high-speed chase that ended in Lake View Terrace. Id. King suffered numerous injuries, and
was held for three days at the Los Angeles County Jail before being released. Id. Prosecutors later announced
that no charges would be filed against him. Id. His attorney was quoted as saying he was "contemplating a $56
million lawsuit--SI million for each blow he received." Id.
83.
Id. Taser guns are armed with darts in the form of electric needles which are used to shoot dangerous
suspects. Roger Parloff, Maybe the Jury Was Right, THE AM. LAW., June 1992, at 7, availablein LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Newspaper File. The darts are attached to wires and deliver an electric shock of 50,000 volts for a
period of several seconds. Id.
84.
There were at least 27 uniformed officers from various agencies present: 21 LAPD, four from the
California Highway Patrol and two from the Los Angeles Unified School District. Richard A. Serrano, Police
Documents Disclose Beating Was Downplayed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at Al, available in LExis, Nexis
Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Beating Was Downplayed. Police sources said that at least one of the
officers at the scene was black. Id.
85.
Id. at Al. Officers at the scene thought King was on PCP, however, toxicology tests later showed
no evidence of drugs or alcohol. Tracey Wood and Sheryl Stolberg, Patrol CarLog In Beating Released, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al [hereinafter PatrolCar Log]. An emergency room physician who examined King
shortly after the incident, determined that there was 'no clinical evidence' that King had taken drugs. Beating
Was Downplayed, supra note 84, at AI.
86.
Powell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 232 Cal. App, 3d 785, 790 (1991), 293 Cal. Rptr.
777, 780 (1991). George Holliday, a 33-year-old local manager for a national plumbing company, sold the
videotape to Los Angeles local television station KTLA Channel 5. To Hell And Back, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Dec.
28, 1992, at 135, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File [hereinafter, To Hell and Back). Holliday
received only $500 for his videotape from KTLA, the local station that first aired the incriminating footage. Id.
He has filed a $100 million lawsuit against several stations for copyright violations. Id. Holliday has promised
to contribute his profits to Social Reform, an organization he created to fund educational projects and fledgling
businesses in South Central Los Angeles. Id.
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provoked a prolonged investigation, and the District Attorney brought
charges against four of the twenty-seven police officers present at the
scene of the incident.87 None of the other presiding officers were ever
charged.8"
The videotape shows Sergeant Stacey Koon89 firing and striking
Rodney King with two 50,000-volt Taser darts. 90 It then shows police
officers Laurence Powell, 91 Timothy Wind,92 Theodore Briseno, and
Sergeant Koon each striking Rodney King.93 A total of fifty-six blows

87.
The Christopher Commission Report, supra note 2, at AI2. The charges were described as follows:
Charge I: Alleges that officers Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind, Theodore Briseno and Sgt. Stacey
Koon assaulted King by force likely to produce great bodily injury and with a deadly weapon. Charge
2: Alleges that officers Powell, Wind, Briseno and Koon 'did willfully, unlawfully, under color of
authority and without lawful necessity assault and beat" King. Charge 3: Alleges that Powell
'knowingly and intentionally made statements in the (police) report which he knew to be false.
Charge 4: Alleges that Koon intentionally made statements he knew to be false. Charge 5: Alleges
that Koon knew a felony had been committed and 'did harbor, conceal and aid' Powell 'with the
intent that he might avoid escape from arrest, trial, conviction and punishment.'.
The Investigation of a Brutal Beating; Initial Indictments Only Begin to Suggest the Full Dimension of What
Happened, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1991, at B5, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. Koon faced
an additional charge of being an accessory after the fact in what District Attorney Ira Reiner called a 'coverup.' Reaching For Doubt, supra note 3, at 62.
88.
The Investigation of a Brutal Beating; Initial Indictments Only Begin to Suggest the Full Dimension
of What Happened, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1991, at B5, available in LEIXS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
Briseno, like the other three officers, was charged first with assault with a deadly weapon (which is
alternately defined as assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury). Id. The jury came to understand
that any blow to King's head, if unreasonable and intentional, would satisfy this count. Id.
The second charge also made against the three other defendants claimed the excessive use of force under
the color of authority. Id. Under this claim, if Briseno had assaulted or beaten King without 'lawful necessity,'
he would be found guilty of the second count. Id.
Finally, as to Koon, though he had never touched King, if an officer under his command was found guilty
of assault, the jury could convict Koon for the same crime. Id. If, on the other hand, all of the officers were not
guilty, then according to the judge's instructions, Koon must also be acquitted. Il
89.
At age 40, Sergeant Stacey C. Koon was a 14-year LAPD veteran. King Affair, supra note 2, at Al.
At the scene he twice fired 50,000-volt Taser darts at King. Id. However, apparently he tried at one point to stop
the beating. Id. Koon later wrote in his daily report that King's injuries were 'of a minor nature,' but called
the beating 'a big time use of force' in a computer message. Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. Officer Laurence M. Powell was 28 years old and was a three-year veteran of the force at the time
of the incident. Id. He is seen on videotape kicking and clubbing King repeatedly with his nightstick, including
at least five blows to the head and neck. Id. Computer messages from his squad car included one that said, "I
haven't beaten anyone this bad in a long time." Id. He later submitted a report saying that King had suffered
only "contusions and abrasions." Id.
92.
Id. Powell's partner, Officer Timothy Wind, was a 30-year-old rookie probationer at the time of the
incident. Id. He came to the LAPD after eight years on a 54-member force in a suburb of Kansas City, Kansas.
Id. The videotape captures Wind striking King with his baton. Id. Wind concurred with Powell in submitting
a report that understated King's injuries. Id.
93.
Id. Officer.Ted Briseno, a nine-year veteran, was 38 years old at the time of the King incident. Id.
He was seen in the videotape kicking King once. Id. He was disciplined for using excessive force in 1987 when
he kicked and hit a handcuffed suspect with his baton. Id. He was suspended for 66 days without pay. Id. He
had vowed not to let it happen again. Id.
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were delivered with their batons. 94 The videotape also captures the
officers kicking Rodney King's head and body six times during the
beating.95 Except for Koon, not one of the police officers on the scene
intervened to prevent the beating or control the escalation of violence. 6
Upon medical examination, King was found suffering from multiple skull
fractures,97 permanent brain damage, a broken ankle, jaw and leg, a
shattered eye socket and cheekbone, kidney damage, and severe
neurological damage resulting in paralysis of the left side of his face.98
Particularly disturbing was the fact that Powell and Wind waited two
hours before taking King to the hospital.99 A prosecution witness testified
that Powell and Wind "stopped at the station and Powell told a war story
about the arrest while King sat in the back of the patrol car complaining
about pain in his eye."' Also disturbing is the jovial bantering about
the incident by the arresting officers and other members of the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Nurses working at the hospital where
King was initially admitted reported that the police officers joked and

94.
The ChristopherCommission Report, supra note 2, at A12.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
See PatrolCarLog, supranote 85, at Al (noting that the base of King's skull revealed eleven broken
bones).
98.
Sheryl Stolberg and Tracy Wood, Grand Jury to Probe Beating of Motorist, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1991, at BI, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. The treating physician, Dr. Edmund Chein,
found irreparable injuries, including what he termed as a "blowout of thef[right] eye orbit." Id. This essentially
means that the bones holding the eye in its socket are permanently cracked. Id.
99.
King Case Redtav, supra note 4, at 1. In the context of police brutality, "most claims of denial of
medical attention arise not from injuries sustained in jail or prison but from beatings or other abuse inflicted by
police during or immediately after arrest." AVERY & RuDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 2-57. A deliberate failure
to provide necessary medical treatment to a pretrial detainee is actionable under § 1983. Id. at 2-54; see City
of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1976); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1987); Daniels v. Gilbreath, 668 F.2d 477,481 (10th
Cir. 1982); Robinson v. Moreland, 655 F.2d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing the liability that results from
failing to provide medical treatment). This deliberate failure is also actionable under the Due Process Clause.
AVERY & RuDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 2-56; see City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,
244 (1983); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307
(10th Cir. 1985); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding liability under the Due Process
Clause for a deliberate failure to provide medical attention).
Liability may also be premised on the Eighth Amendment. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 2-56;
see id. (noting that although "[t]he Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment only
applies to convicted persons, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,671-72 (1977); Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183,
1186 (3d Cir. 1978), [tlhe court in City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, held that
a pretrial detainee's due process rights 'are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to
a convicted prisoner."').
100. King Case Redux, supra note 4, at 1. Moreover, "Powell and Wind did not note the station stopover
in their log books, which, according to another witness, violated departmental policy." Id.
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boasted of the number of times they struck Rodney King.'' This attitude
was later shown to be endemic in the LAPD. A subsequent survey
sponsored by the LAPD found that officers felt entitled to use "street
justice" against troublesome suspects."02 Further investigations revealed
other reports of incidents of police brutality. 0 3 This evidence came by
way of the Mobile Digital Terminal or MDT, a computer-system network
which connects the police-car computers to police headquarters. In
addition, numerous incriminating and telling racial epithets were typed into
the MDT computer by the police officers."° These incidents, coupled
with conflicting documentary evidence concerning the Rodney King
tragedy in Lake View Terrace, "prompted allegations that the beating fits
a pattern of abuse by Los Angeles officers"10 5 which only further
undermines the public confidence in the LAPD and law enforcement in
general.
2. The Trials
On April 29, 1992, the four LAPD officers charged were acquitted of
ten of the eleven counts against them, and the jury deadlocked eight to
06
four in favor of acquittal on one excessive force count against Powell.'
Immediately following the announcement of the verdict, South Central Los
Angeles erupted in the worst rioting that the United States has experienced
in the 20th century.0 7 The riot left 53 dead, 2,383 injured, and 17,000
arrested.'0 8 Destruction of property and looting in the riot-torn area
resulted in damages of approximately $1 billion.1°9
One month after the state verdict, a federal grand jury was assembled
and all four defendants were eventually indicted on charges of violating

101. Richard A. Serrano, LAPD Officers Reportedly Taunted King in Hospital,L.A. TIM, Mar. 23,1991,
at Al, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
102. The Christopher Commission Report, supra note 2, at A12.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Beating Was Downplayed, supra note 84, at Al.
106. Reaching ForDoubt, supra note 3, at 62.
107. U.S. Files Charges,supra note 2, at Al.
108. To Hell and Back, supra note 86, at 135.
109. Robert Reinhold, Rebuilding Lags and Los Angeles A Year After Riots, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993,
at Al. But see Angela Oh, Race, Ethnicity and Law Enforcement (C-SPAN/2, television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1993)
(reporting damage figures of $750 million).
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Rodney King's civil rights. 1° The jury was comprised of two AfricanAmericans, one Latino, and nine Caucasians.111 On April 17, 1993, after
100 exhibits, 61 witnesses and 40 hours of deliberation,' the jury
returned a verdict of guilty for Powell and Koon, and acquitted Briseno
and Wind. 1 3 Powell was found guilty of violating King's constitutional
right to be free from an arrest made with the use of unreasonable
force. 14 Koon was convicted of permitting a civil-rights violation to
occur." 5 On August 4, 1993, Koon and Powell were each sentenced to
prison terms of two and one-half years by U.S. District Court Judge John
G. Davies. 16 On September 27, 1993 they surrendered to federal prison
officials and their sentence was pushed back to October 12, 1993, while
they appealed their convictions to the U.S. Supreme Court. 117 The two
men lost, on appeal, their motion to remain free on bail pending the appeal
of their convictions."' They began serving their sentences on October
12, 1993."9

110. Jim Newton, 2 Officers, 2 Acquitted; Guarded Caln Follows Verdicts In King Case; Trial: Federal
Juty Finds That Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell Violated Beating Victin's Civil Rights. Sentencing is Set
ForAug. 4., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Guarded Calm].
111.
d
112. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts
File.
113. Guarded Calm, supra note 110, at Al.
114. Jim Newton, Powell, Koon Surrender To Begin Prison Sentences, L.A. TIo, Oct. 13, 1993, at B 1
[hereinafter Powell, Koon Surrender].
115. Amy Stevens, Split Decision: Verdict in King Case Owes Much to Lessons of State-CourtTrial, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 19, 1993, at Al, availablein LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. The charges were described as:
COUNT ONE Alleged that Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind and Theodore Briseno 'while acting
under color of the laws of the state of California, aiding and abetting each other, did willfully strike
with batons, kick and stomp Rodney Glen King.' By these actions the indictment said, they willfully
deprived King of the constitutional right 'not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law,
including the right to be secure in his person and free from the intentional use of unreasonable force
by making arrest under color of law'; and COUNT TWO Alleged that Stacey Koon, a police
sergeant, 'did willfully permit other Los Angeles police officers in his presence and under his
supervision ...

[to] unlawfully strike with batons, kick and stomp Rodney Glen King ...

and did

willfully fail to prevent this unlawful assault; resulting in bodily injury to Rodney Glen King.' The
indictment alleged [that] this deprived King of a constitutional right 'not to be deprived of liberty
without due process of law, including the right to be free from harm while in official custody.'
Id.
116. U.S. Attorney Appeals Rodney King Verdict, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 30, 1993, at 5, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. Koon and Powell could have been sentenced up to 10 years in prison
and fined up to $250,000. Id. Instead, Judge Davies imposed lesser sentences, in part because he thought King
provoked the beating and because the two were good family men. Id.
117. LA. Officers FreedFrom Prison; Granted Two Weeks To Appeal, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 28,
1993, at 5, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
118. Powell, Koon Surrender,supra note 114, at BI.
119. Id.
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The Stewart and King cases reflect some of the difficulties encountered
in excessive force litigation. The initial response to a claim of police
brutality is to side with the police and believe their account of the force
that was necessary to apprehend a particular suspect. Although the
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an
accused officer is guilty, there is an additional burden on the victim to
prove that the brutality actually occurred.12 While evidence of physical
injury is a good starting point, the victim-plaintiff must also prove that the
force used was excessive under the circumstances."' The victim of
police brutality must overcome the credibility of the officers in what often
amounts to the victim's word against that of one or more officers. These
obstacles are present in the thousands of brutality complaints filed each
year. The disturbing proposition in these cases is that the facts support the
belief that the problem may be systemic and the motivation may be racial.
In fact, it appears that race continues to play a prominent role in
determining the fate of a person involved in the law enforcement and
judicial systems. The findings of a recent Newsweek poll support this
proposition. 2 2 For example, the poll stated that forty-six percent of
Caucasians and seventy-five percent of African-Americans surveyed felt
that African-Americans charged with crimes are treated more harshly than
caucasians in the judicial system. 12 3 Similarly, an ABA-sponsored poll
of 401 federal and state judges found that "35 percent of the judges felt
the racial makeup of the jury contributed at least somewhat to the
acquittals in the first trial, but only 29 percent of them felt the racial
makeup of the jury contributed at least somewhat to the guilty verdicts in
the second trial."' 24

120. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the degree of proof a plaintiff
must submit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in order to overcome defendant's motion for a summary judgment or
qualified immunity). The standard required to establish a prima facie case is sufficient evidence in the type of
case to get plaintiff past a motion for directed verdict in a jury case or motion to dismiss in a non-jury case; it
is the evidence necessary to require a defendant to proceed with his case. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729
(9th Cir. 1974). As exemplified in a June, 1993 ABA-sponsored Gallup Poll of 401 state and federal judges,
60% stated that the officers in the Rodney King beating probably would not have been convicted in the federal
civil rights trial had it not been for the videotape evidence. Gary A. Hengstler, The Justice System: How Judges
View Retrial of LA. Cops, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (1993).
121. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (discussing the standard used in determining the
reasonableness of force used by a police officer).
122. The Newsweek Poll © 1992 by Newsweek, Inc. For this poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed
a national sample of 242 black adults and 350 white adults by telephone between April 30 and May 1, 1992.
Id,
123. Id.
124. Hengstler, supra note 120, at 70.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 25
III. OBSTACLES To EFFECTIVE LITIGATION
A. ProsecutorialDiscretion
The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are brought before the
District Attorney's office with the help of the police. 125 The prosecution,
in turn, relies on the police to help them make their case by calling the

officers to the stand as the prosecution's star witnesses. Since the
prosecutor and the police work in tandem to convict those arrested by the
officers, a dilemma arises in that police officers are taught that the District
Attorney is their ally. If an officer is charged, however, their ally suddenly
becomes their nemesis. 6 This working relationship between the
prosecutor and the police fails to keep the two at arm's length and can
often lead to a conflict of interest between the prosecutor's duty to
investigate a civilian complaint or prosecute a brutality case, and the

prosecutor's alliance with the accused officer. 27 There are no statutes,
or even departmental regulations, to guide the prosecution in determining
which cases to prosecute or to compel the prosecution of certain cases.
Because the District Attorney reserves exclusive discretion to prosecute or
dismiss a citizen's charge of police brutality, 128 prosecutorial discretion
is one of several obstacles private citizens face when they bring brutality
charges against police officers.
Police officers charged with using excessive force will likely argue that
the force used was necessary to immobilize and arrest the suspect and that
it was balanced against their need to protect themselves from harm.

125. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & HAROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 13.1, at 621 (discussing
how police officers assist the District Attorney's office in the investigation and evaluation of cases) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
126. Edward A. Adams, Client's Stress, Publicity Among Issues Plaguing Police Defense Lawyers, 205
N.Y. LJ. 1 (Apr. 8, 1991), available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. Moreover, District Attorneys
resist joining anti-police brutality prosecution units because it conflicts with their long-term career goals.
Committee on Criminal Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Need For A Special
ProsecutorForCriminalJustice 7 (Feb. 1993). As R. Harcourt Dodds, the former Brooklyn Executive Assistant
District Attorney points out, *the [assistant District Attorneys] believed that 'over the long term' their careers
would be 'compromised by being identified with a unit the cops did not like."' Id.
127. Tough to Prosecute, supra note 5, at 1; see id. (noting that the problem is a "challenge to the
prosecutors' credibility because of the 'inherent conflict' that stems from the close working relationship
between police officers and prosecutors."). To minimize the pressure on prosecutors and their investigators many
District Attorneys have special units that handle only police corruption cases or brutality cases or both. Id. Los
Angeles has a 15-attorney unit that handles brutality cases only. Id. Both prosecutors in the King case, Terry
White and Alan Yochelson, were assigned to that unit. Id.
128. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supranote 125, § 13.2, at 623 (explaining that the District Attorney has broad
discretion to prosecute or dismiss criminal charges).
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Precisely because police receive training to be expert witnesses, are often
their own witnesses, and are usually the only witness other than the victim,
it is difficult to refute their assertions. It is also for these reasons that not
only the prosecutors but the jurors are more inclined to believe the police
rather than the victim.129 The implementation of independent Civilian
Complaint Review Boards (CCRB's)130 is one means of monitoring and
suspending absolute prosecutorial discretion. Unfortunately, CCRB's are
not a fail-safe solution. CCRB's cannot screen for victim stigmatizing by
either the prosecution or the jurors. This inability can ultimately influence
prosecutorial discretion and enhance the credibility of police officers, as
compared to the victim's believability.
B. Stereotyping
The jury system is meant to be a balanced cross section of the
population which reflects the beliefs of the average person. 131 However,
this may not always be the case. A juror's stereotypical perception of
police officers and the persons they arrest were brought out in the initial
King case by a New York Times reporter who interviewed several of the
Simi Valley jurors.' 32 Several jurors had 'a predisposed negative
stereotype image of Rodney King and a predisposed positive stereotype
image of the police. 133 For example, Anna Whiting, a fifty-four-year-old
printer and a registered Democrat, stated that she would not have voted
guilty under any circumstances and did not feel responsible for other
people's actions after the verdict. 34 One reporter noted that "[i]t
probably was [Whiting] who said cavalierly in a post-trial interview that
it was Rodney King who controlled (from his prone position on the
ground) how soon the police officers could handcuff him."'135 Another
juror, Virginia Loya, 136 explained that she had agonized over the verdict
129. Tough To Prosecute, supra note 5, at 1;see id. (explaining that in brutality cases, the police officer
is often the only witness and many jurors are reluctant to believe that officers would perjure themselves and
furthermore, the suspect-victims may have long arrest records which tend to undermine their credibility).
130. See infra notes 155-162 and accompanying text (explaining the function of Civilian Complaint
Review Boards).
131. LISA BLUE & JANE N. SAGINAW, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE § 1:13.
132. Joseph Kelner and Robert S. Kelner, The Rodney King Verdict and Voir Dire,207 N.Y. L.J. 100, 100
(May 26, 1992), availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Virginia Loya is married, 40 years old and a registered Democrat. Id. at 100. She works at a hospital
as a housekeeper. Id.
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that acquitted the four police officers.' 37 She said that a large majority
of the jurors were inclined to acquit the defendants almost from the
beginning of their deliberations, but that three or four jurors, who briefly
held out for at least one guilty verdict, were overwhelmed by the
others.1 38 This juror described the King jury as seeing only what they
wanted to see, as if they had already made up their minds. 139 These
stereotypes may reflect a geographic uniqueness, a nationwide problem, or
even poor voir dire by defense counsel. Whatever their source or cause,
they nevertheless reflect upon the integrity of the judicial system and the
verdict at hand.' 40
African-Americans like Michael Stewart and Rodney King are often
stereotyped and labeled guilty just by virtue of their race and their socioeconomic backgrounds.' 14 Officers arresting individuals like Stewart and
King are viewed as risking their lives "to protect and to serve" the lawabiding citizens. This is well-reflected in the King case where an analysis
of the jurors' deliberations reveals how their reverence for police officers
as guardians of the social order colored their view of the entire case. At
the same time, the jurors' low regard for people like Rodney King, a
paroled felon who had been arrested for driving drunk and resisting arrest,
made it inconceivable that they could sympathize with him as the victim
of an alleged crime. Rather, the jurors adopted the image of King
presented by the defense at trial: a hulking, ferocious criminal suspect
whom the officers had reason to fear and, therefore, reason to beat.
"[King] is the only criminal, said juror42Renee Kracow. He's free. And
these four men have lost their careers."'1
Juror stereotyping affected the federal and state trials differently. In the
federal trial, Rodney King was called to testify and was able to contradict
the possible juror stereotyping with his soft-spoken manner and affable

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Theoretically, the prosecution and defense teams are advocating on a level playing field where
everyone might pursue equal justice. Id. However, certain defendants have resources which strain the
prosecution's tight budget and render the playing field not so level, Id. In the King case, the LAPD paid nearly
$500,000 for the defense of the officers. US Files Charges, supra note 2. We know that 65% of the ABAsponsored Gallup Poll of 401 state and federal judges concluded that the prosecution made a tactical error which
resulted in the acquittals in the first trial. Hengstler, supra note 120, at 70.
141. Interview with Dr. Ali Khadivi, Ph.D., Senior Psychologist, Department of Psychiatry, North Central
Bronx Hospital, New York City, N.Y. (May 14, 1993) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journat). See AVERY
& RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 14-14 (discussing problems which police misconduct plaintiffs face when being
viewed by prospective jurors).
142. Reaching ForDoubt, supra note 3, at 62.
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demeanor.143 This trial tactic assisted the prosecution by adding an
essential human dimension to King which was so clearly absent in the first
trial. King's testimony also helped to diminish the stereotyped image
previously created by the defense in the earlier state trial.
That race played a crucial part in the outcome of the first Rodney King
trial is indisputable. As one juror from that trial is quoted as saying, "Most
of us, we believe in law and order, and we haven't been in trouble with
the law." 1" This same juror, Knight, a 49 year-old cable technician for
California Edison, said he could not understand why the prosecution
accepted him on the panel.1 45 Knight continued by stating that if he were
the District Attorney, he would try to get jurors who were sympathetic to
minorities or something like that.146 In fact, most of the jurors said that,
at the beginning of the trial, they believed there would be convictions.147
However, by the start of deliberations, where race and racism were rarely
48
mentioned, a majority of the panelists were leaning toward acquittal.1
This analysis of how the jurors viewed the case according to its pieces, not
its whole, reveals how bias tainted their verdict. 49
IV. ALTERNATIVES To CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
There are alternative ways to bring about the criminal prosecution and
punishment of police misconduct. This section explores various alternatives
available to private citizens seeking justice against law-enforcement agents
who used excessive force. The following actions can be taken
independently or in conjunction with criminal prosecution: (1) Alert
independent agencies, such as Civilian Complaint Review Boards
5
(CCRB's), of the complaint filed against the law enforcement officer; 1
(2) seek monetary restitution by filing a civil action against the law
enforcement agent and, the employing municipality;15' and (3) apply the
143. King Case Redux, supra note 4, at 1. Sixty-five percent of judges surveyed believed that King's
testimony in the second trial contributed to the guilty verdicts, with 55% of the judges agreeing that prosecutors
in the first trial erred in failing to bring King to the stand. Hengstler, supra note 120, at 70.
144. Reaching for Doubt, supra note 3,at 62.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See infra notes 155-162 and accompanying text (discussing the functions of a Civilian Complaint
Review Board).
151. See infra notes 197-257 and accompanying text (discussing complaints and litigation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
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general recommendations made by various organizations 152 to incidents
involving police misconduct. 5 3 To facilitate the effectiveness of
misconduct investigations, civilian complaints of excessive force should be
databased in a computer monitored by an outside agency. This will identify
multiple offenders and earmark municipalities with high incidents of police
misconduct.' 54 These alternatives will not necessarily eradicate the
problem of police brutality. They will, however, assist in providing an
immediate solution to prosecuting brutality cases, promoting deterrence,
and reinstating public confidence in our judicial and law enforcement
systems.
A. Civilian Complaint Review Boards
Civil rights organizations and minority groups have often protested the
155
frequent mishandling of civilian complaints of police misconduct.
Public opinion has been that valid complaints of police misconduct are not
being properly recognized by the internal investigations arm of the police
departments, known as the Internal Affairs Division (IAD).156 In the past,
there has been a profound inadequacy in the procedural mechanisms for
handling such complaints.'
As a result, citizens rallied for an
independent investigatory body to conduct neutral investigations separate
and apart from that of the IAD. There was a struggle to find a reasonable
and effective method by which valid complaints of police misconduct
would be processed judiciously and expediently. The product of these
efforts was the creation of a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB).
One purpose of the CCRB was to assist in apportioning liability or
responsibility for police misconduct. 158 Another purpose was to help
restore public confidence in the integrity of the police and the judicial
system. 5 9 Public confidence was at a low because of the widespread

152. The organizations made the recommendations for general purposes and did not specify police
misconduct as among them.
153. See infra notes 258-263 and accompanying text (describing recommendations made by other
organizations).
154. See infra notes 264-268 and accompanying text (stating the authors! recommendations).
155. Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission:A Deterrentof Police Misconduct, 59 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 5, 6-13 (1981) [hereinafter, Littlejohn].
156. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 9.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Peter G. Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints Against the Police, 20 U.
TORONTO W. 448, 459-60 (1970).
159. Id.
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belief that the police would not regulate themselves without impropriety,
such as that in the Stewart and King cases, in which there were cover-ups,
botched investigations, and perjured police testimony. 160 Citizens
believed that the impropriety would cease to exist with the creation of an
independent CCRB.1 6' An independent body would enable citizens, not
police officers, to perform "policing functions ' ' over the officers in the
police department.
A CCRB is comprised of a group of civilians and/or law enforcement
personnel appointed by the mayor, city council, or police
commissioner.1 63 The CCRB is mandated to investigate the merits of a
civilian complaint of police misconduct in order to determine whether the
charges can be sustained. 164 Once it is determined that a complaint is
valid, the CCRB may elect to recommend or supervise further investigation
through the police department. 65 With respect to criminal prosecution, the
District Attorney reserves the final decision to prosecute, and, with respect
to departmental disciplinary actions, the final decision on whether or not
to take any measures against an offending officer rests with the police
department. The specific type of disciplinary action
usually falls within the
66
commissioner.
or
chief
police
the
of
jurisdiction
While civilians have complained of the burdensome procedural
bureaucracy of the internal police-review boards, the police have
steadfastly opposed independent civilian-review boards. 67 Critics contend
that the civilians on the CCRB's lack the necessary understanding to
appreciate the risks involved in daily police work and to fairly assess the
merits of a complaint.168 Other commentators argue that the existing

160. See supra notes 33-36, 49-52, 89-105 and accompanying text (providing examples of alleged coverups, botched investigations and perjured testimony from both the Stewart and King incidents).
161. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 9.
162. While the term 'policing functions" has never been specifically defined, it is used to describe the
tasks which the CCRB will perform. It should enable citizens to police the activities of the police departments.
Citizens are: (1) More likely to be detached from the internal politics of the police departments, (2) unimpeded
by conflicting interests in advancement or promotion in the police force, (3) less likely to have friends working
on the force who could cause them to be partial in an investigation, and (4) not subject to the same harassment
or intimidation a member of the force would experience. Overall, it is less likely they will compromise their
duties.
163. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 8.
164. Id. at 8, 9.
165. Id.
166. Jonathan P. Hicks, DinkinsAnnounces Accord ForBoard On Police Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1992, at Al, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Dinkins Announces].
167. Id.
168. Harold Beral & Marcus Sisk, Note, The Administration of Cotnplaints Against the Police, 77 HARV.
L. R v. 499, 518 (1963) (describing the problems involved with the criminal prosecution of police officers).
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systems for processing complaints are sufficient and civilian review boards
are unnecessary. 169 Some critics oppose civilian conducted hearings
because their non-judicial character could have consequences that may
infringe upon the police officers' fundamental rights. 70 Despite the
opposition and criticism opposing the use of CCRB's,
they have
7'
nationwide.'
cities
numerous
in
nevertheless emerged
One of the earlier, more effective CCRB's was founded in New York
City. 72 The election of Mayor John V. Lindsay was followed by the
appointment of a new Police Commissioner, Howard R. Leary, who, unlike
his predecessor, Vincent Broderick, was a strong proponent of
CCRB's.173 Leary's leadership resulted in the creation of an improved
CCRB with significant amendments to the existing set of CCRB
regulations, guidelines, and procedures. 74 The new board had a civilian
majority and was created under a general departmental order.17 Whereas
the old CCRB received an average of 200 complaints per year, 76 the
new CCRB received an average of 100 complaints per month during its
short-lived four-month operation. 77 While the new CCRB was eminently
more successful than the CCRB it replaced, it was abolished due to citizen

169. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 9; see Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Dep't of Internal Affairs, Civilian Review Boards: An Objective Appraisal, in SELECTION OF ARTICLES FOR
AND ABOUT POLICEMEN 118 (1965) (discussing the role and utility of Civilian Complaint Review Boards).
170. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 10.
171. See id. at 9-10 (providing some of the criticisms against citizen CCRB's).
172. Id. at 21-23,
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id. at 20-21. The procedures were as follows: (1) There was a 60-day statute of limitations, which
could be waived if a criminal or civil action was pending; (2) the complaint could be filed at the Civilian
Complaint Review Board or with any police officer or police organization; (3) the complaint could be in writing,
by telephone, or in person; (4) all complaints filed must be forwarded to the Civilian Complaint Review Board;
(5) all complaints were investigated, regardless of whether the complainant withdrew or not; and (6) any accused
officer was entitled to an attorney. ALGERNON BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE 77-93 (1968) [hereinafter
BLACK].
175. Littlejohn, supra,note 155, at 20. The Civilian Complaint Review Board had seven members. BLACK,
supra note 174, at 77-93. Four members were prominent citizens appointed by the Mayor and three members
were high-ranking police officers appointed by the commissioner. Id. The general order was New York Police
Department, General Order No. 14 (Sept. 13, 1965). Id. Amendments to the Rules and Procedures state the
following:
General Order No. 14 authorized the Board to investigate and to review allegations of misconduct
by members of the department involving: (1) Unnecessary or excessive use of force; (2) abuse of
authority (including unreasonable action taken in an official capacity which deprives individuals of
the rights guaranteed by law); (3) discourtesy, or abusive or insulting language; and (4) language,
conduct, or behavior which is derogatory of a person's race, religion, creed, or national origin.
Id.
176. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 20.
177. Id.
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concern that it would interfere with effective law enforcement. 178
Subsequent to its dismantling, there was a long period when the CCRB's
in New York were ineffectual.
A third CCRB was created in 1993 by Mayor David N. Dinkins. On
January 5, 1993, .Mayor Dinkins signed a bill which created the first allcivilian CCRB in New York City. 79 The bill was presented to the Mayor
by the city council, which had reached a majority vote of 41-9 in favor 18
of0
establishing an independent CCRB to investigate police misconduct.
This 1993 CCRB is designed to operate independently from policedepartment investigations of misconduct.181 The CCRB's powers include
an independent budget, the power to subpoena, and the capability to recruit
civilian investigators to investigate complaints concerning law-enforcement
officers.1 82 The new 1993 CCRB replaced the previous twelve-member
CCRB on July 5, 1993.183 The old board consisted of six civilian
members and six board members, who were high-ranking officials from the
police department.1'8 The investigatorial staff was a mix of uniformed
police officers and civilians.' 85 This 1993 CCRB consists of thirteen
members. Five were nominated by the Mayor. 86 Another five consist of
one representative from each of the five boroughs, and were nominated by
the City Council. 87 The Police Commissioner, Raymond Kelly,
appointed the remaining three members. 88

178.

Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 20. After a vote, 63% of people decided to abolish the CCRB because

of a fear that a successful CCRB would deter the police from doing their job. D. ABBOTT Er AL., POLICE,
POLncs AND RACE: THE NEW YORK CITY REFERENDUM ON CIVILIAN REvIEw 43-44 (1969).

179. Michael H. Cottman, Cop Review Board Signed into Law, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 6, 1993, at 26,
available in LExis, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. The modem trend is that "more and more cities are
establishing separate civilian agencies to monitor police conduct." Maria Newman, Report Details Variations
in Police Review Boards, N.Y. TiEs, Jan. 10, 1993, at 26, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File
[hereinafter Report Details]. Of the nation's 50 largest cities, 33 now have some form of civilian review
procedures, and just over half were established in the last two and a half years. Id.
180. Michael H. Cottman, All-Civilian Board Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at 140, availablein LEXIs,
Nexis Library, Newspaper File.
181. Council Creates Agency for Complaints Against Police, U.P.I., Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIs,
Nexis Library, Newspaper File [hereinafter Council Creates Agency].
182. Id.; see Dinkins Announces, supra note 166 (explaining that CCRB's have the power to subpoena).
183. Council Creates Agency, supra note 181.

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The 10 nominees chosen from the Mayor and the Council recommendations will be civilians who

have no experience as officers; however, they can be former prosecutors. Report Details, supra note 179, at 26.
188. Report Details,supra note 179, at 26. The three members who are Commissioner-recommended must

be former police officers. Id.
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In Los Angeles, an independent, all civilian ad hoc committee, the
Christopher Commission, was assembled to study, among other things, the
videotaped LAPD beating of black motorist Rodney King. 8 9 The
investigation led the Commission to conclude that there probably would
not have been an effective police department investigation had there not
been the secretly videotaped evidence of the Rodney King incident.1 90 In
the course of its investigation, the Commission reviewed 700 prior
complaints of police misconduct..' 9' Those complaints containing
inconsistencies were disregarded for purposes of the study.' 92
This Christopher Commission and many CCRB's have very limited
jurisdiction.'93 Historically, CCRB's were essentially powerless and
lacked any independent investigatory powers. 94 Police misconduct rising
to a level of severe brutality would probably be turned over to the District
Attorney's office for investigation instead of a CCRB. Prior to 1967, all
CCRB's acted merely in an advisory capacity. 95 Unfortunately, these
limitations on CCRB's rendered them ineffective. Only in recent years has
the notion of independent investigatorial powers been accepted in an effort
to establish a buffer zone between police and civilians. 19 6 In the cases of
Michael Stewart and Rodney King, an independent CCRB with
independent authority or a more powerful version of the Christopher
Commission would have been an effective alternative, apart from the
district attorney, to investigate police brutality.
B. Civil Suits Involving Police Misconduct
In addition to bringing criminal charges, a victim of police brutality
can also bring a civil action for monetary damages.' 97 Victims' civil

189. John L. Mitchell, 44 'Problem Officers' at LAPD Are Retained Or Off The Force; Law Enforcement:
Report To Police Commission Says Most Received Counseling. Others Quit Or Were Fired,L.A. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1992, at B3, available in LExIs, Nexis Library Majpap File.
190. The MacNei/Lehrer News Hour: LA.P.D.; Swords into Plowshares;Smoking Gun?; Getting Even
(Educational Broadcast, July 9, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File.
191. Christopher Commission Report, supra note 42, at A12.
192. Id.
193. See Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 8 (discussing CCRB's generally).
194. Id. at 10.
195.

THE PRESIDENT-S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT. THE POLICE 200 (1967).
196. Littlejohn, supra note 155, at 8-10.
197. AvERY & RUDOvsKY, supra note 13, at 3-2 (discussing state and federal remedies for civil rights
violations). Police Watch statistics inform us that in 1990 there were 2,600 complaints of police misconduct in
Los Angeles (of which 616 were brought against the LAPD). Angela Oh, President of the Korean Bar

196
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suits would eventually have a deterrent effect on police misconduct;
beyond the cost of financial restitution for the victim, the effect of costly
litigation and threat of punitive damages would compel the adoption of
new standards of conduct for law-enforcement agents. 198 Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress... shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.' 99
This statute excepts traditional governmental immunity and enables private
citizens to bring legal action against a public official to remedy the
deprivation of their constitutional rights. 00 Section 1983 has found wide
application in excessive force litigation.2"' A victim of excessive force
should be concerned with, among other things, two issues during case
preparation: (1) The standard which the court will apply when determining
the outcome of the case,2 "2 and (2) the governmental immunities that
203
may attach to the cause of action.

Association, Race, Ethnicity and Law Enforcement, (C-SPAN/2 television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1993). In 1991,
there were 2,425 reported incidents of police brutality in Los Angeles, for which settlement claims of $13
million have already been paid. Id.
198. However, Los Angeles city attomey statistics illustrate the difficulty of proving police brutality. David
Newdorf, No Bounce From Beating Video; Other Brutality Cases Seem Unaffected By Publicity From Rodney
King Case, RECORDER, Mar. 27, 1991, at I, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper File. For example,
since 1980, from a minimum of 200 to over 300 brutality suits have been filed annually; however, last year only
78 civil suits against the police department went to trial, of which plaintiffs won 17. Id. While the average award
was $183,430, the city settled another 85 cases for an average of $57,015 each. Id.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
200. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (discussing the scope
and theory of municipal immunity).
201. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 3.4-3.10 (explaining the application of civil remedies in cases
involving civil rights violations).
202. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (discussing the present status of the standard used).
203. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; see id. (discussing the scope and theory of municipality immunity); see
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-08 (1982) (explaining qualified governmental immunity).
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The Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner,2 4 held that the
application of excessive force during an arrest violates an individual's
Fourth Amendment right to be secure against an unreasonable search and
seizure.2 0 5 The Garner court used a reasonable person under the
circumstances test to determine questions of excessive force. 2 6 The
Second Circuit, in Johnson v. Glick, reasoned that a two-fold analysis
should be applied to the facts of the case: (1) Whether the excessive force
used by a police officer upon an individual was in violation of that
207
individual's Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process,
and (2) whether the force used was sufficiently excessive to "shock the
conscience.
In Glick, Judge Friendly applied neither the Fourth nor the Eighth
Amendment, the two most textually obvious sources of constitutional
protection against physically abusive governmental conduct.2 Instead,
Judge Friendly set forth four factors, known as the "substantive due
process" test to guide courts in determining whether police conduct
amounts to a constitutional violation." 0 One of the four criteria used in
this test is whether the individual officers acted in "good faith" or whether
the officer acted with malice or other evil intent which would "shock the
conscience" of the court.21 '

204. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
205. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that, "ft]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
206. Garner,'471 U.S. at 8-9.
207. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, John v. Johnson, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973); see U.S. CONSM. amend. XIV § I (providing that, *[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
208. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. In Gumz v. Morrissette, the court stated that a substantive due process
.shock the conscience" standard should be used to gauge whether there was excessive force used in the arrest.
Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986).
209. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 592 (1989).
210. Glick,.481 F.2d at 1033; see id. (describing the four factors as: (1) The need for the application of
force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of injury
inflicted; and (4) whether force was applied in good faith to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm).
211. Id.
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In Graham v. Connor,2 12 the Supreme Court changed the
constitutional analysis used in excessive force claims.2 13 The Graham
Court rejected the substantive due process "shocking the conscience" test
of Johnson v. Glick."' Rejecting the Second Circuit's test, the Supreme
Court held that a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard5
21
should be used to analyze the facts of an excessive force case.
Therefore, the Graham Court rejected the idea that every excessive force
claim brought under section 1983 is governed by the single generic
standard announced in Glick.216 Instead, the Court determined that a
violation of a citizen's specific constitutional rights should have the same
constitutional standard applied in its analysis of the case. 217 Thus,
excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest or investigatory
stop of a free citizen are properly characterized as invoking the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.2 8
This Fourth Amendment standard enables the court to view facts from
the "perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight." 21 9 In addition, it allows courts to consider the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments
about the amount of force that is necessary, in circumstances that are often
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. 220 The Graham Court stated that
"[a]n officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment
violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an
officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force
constitutional., 22' Therefore, the application of this standard to Fourth
Amendment violations creates a determinable standard which section 1983
claimants can prepare to meet.
Another issue that a section 1983 claimant must consider is whether
there is a qualified governmental immunity which would preclude a claim

212. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
213. Graham v. Conner. 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
214. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393; see supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing the "shock the
conscience" test).
215. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
216. Id. at 393.
217. Id. at 394.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 396.
220. Id. at 396-97.
221. Id. at 397.
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against the officer.22 2 Qualified immunity23 is lifted once an official
has violated an established federal law.224 While the Supreme Court has
upheld the application of qualified immunity to law enforcement
functions, 22 the Graham Court did not address the issue of whether
qualified immunity applies to Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims. 226 This issue has been addressed by later courts, and they have
found that qualified immunity may indeed be asserted as a defense to a
22 8
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.227 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald
the Supreme Court protected an officer from personal liability through its
objective reasonableness standard.229 An additional defense for officers
2 0 where the Second Circuit ruled that
is found in Finnegan v. Fountain,
even if a jury determines that a police officer exceeded the constitutional
use of force, it is the district court which must determine if the officer
should have known that the force was excessive. 23' Thus, in order for
any liability to attach, the trier of fact must determine that the officer used
excessive force and had knowledge that the force was excessive under the
circumstances.232 The defense of qualified immunity coupled with the
Graham test provides an effective two-prong standard which protects the
officer when the objective reasonableness test is applied. 233 Therefore,
a police officer would not be liable for believing, regardless of whether
that belief is mistaken, that the extent or type of force employed was
reasonable.3

222. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-08 (1982) (explaining absolute and qualified
governmental immunities).
223. Id at 815-16 (explaining a qualified immunity as an affirmative defense).
224. ld. at 818.
225. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987).
226. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S 386, 399 n.12 (1989).
227. See Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 822-24 (2d Cir. 1990); Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414,
1419 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the availability of
a qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to monetary liability under a Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim).
228. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
229. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16, 818 (1982).
230. 915 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1990).
231. Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1990).
232. Id.
233. This line of reasoning is consistent with other court decisions. In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court
ruled that a law enforcement officer who carries out an unlawful search (or arrest) without probable cause, will
be protected from personal liability if she nevertheless reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that there was
probable cause for the search or arrest. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
234. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). See also Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463
(10th Cir. 1991) (noting that, in excessive force claims asserted under the Fourth Amendment, the qualified
immunity question is usually answered in the Fourth Amendment inquiry).
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This test serves to protect police officers charged with excessive force
and makes it difficult for section 1983 claimants to prevail. However, in
extreme circumstances, like the Rodney King case where there was actual
video footage of King being beaten, similarly situated section 1983
claimants are likely to overcome the two-prong reasonableness analysis. In
King's case, the court could find that it would not be reasonable to
believe that the extent or type of force used on King was reasonable. On
the other hand, the two-prong reasonableness test would be difficult to
prove in the Michael Stewart case. Although there were many witnesses
available, it would be difficult to prove that the police officers believed
that their actions were excessive in force.235 In any case, it is a difficult,
if not impossible, task to prove that an officer should have known, under
the circumstances, that the actions were unreasonable and excessive in
force.
In questions involving the failure to act by police officers, federal
courts have found officers personally liable under section 1983, when
supervisory and non-supervisory police officers fail to intervene to prevent
a fellow officer from using excessive force.23 6 In Byrd v. Brishke,2 37

the Seventh Circuit stated:
We believe it is now clear that one who is given the badge of
authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by
his presence or otherwise within his knowledge. That responsibility
obviously obtains when the nonfeasor is a supervisory officer to
whose direction misfeasor officers are committed. So, too, the same
responsibility must exist as to non-supervisory officers who are
present at the scene of such summary punishment, for to hold
otherwise would be to insulate non-supervisory officers from

235. For example, the court in Graham grappled with this difficult judgment decision and stated that
reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable police officer on the scene, not based on
hindsight, and should take into account the fact that police officers are often reqtiired to make split-second
judgments about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
Because it is difficult to gauge strength, state of mind or whether the suspect is armed, the officer is rushed into
ajudgment, which, if wrong, could prove to be fatal to the officer. AVERY & RIJDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 2-25.
Failure to follow commands is not a sufficient answer to administer a severe beating precisely because the
suspect's state of mind is unknown and the suspect may not understand what is required or simply may not
be able to comply with the directives a normal person would understand. Id.
236. O'Neill v. Krzeminiski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th
Cir. 1986).
237. 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
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liability for reasonably foreseeable consequences of the neglect of
238
their duty to enforce the laws and preserve the peace.
This case is important in light of the police brutality cases of Michael
Stewart and Rodney King. Both cases involve a failure of police officers
to acknowledge their duty to intervene and to stop other officers from
using excessive force. The six officers involved in Michael Stewart's case
were charged under an omission theory of criminal liability.239 The
omission theory resembles the duty to intervene. 240 The omission theory
failed to convict in the criminal case, but the duty to intervene would
appear to have a better chance of establishing liability in a section 1983
action.
Under the Byrd theory, the officers involved in the Rodney King
incident may be found jointly and severally responsible for each other's
actions. Simply stated, the argument is that the officers should not have
stood by idly while fellow officers beat Rodney King. Police officers are
responsible to recognize their duty to intervene and should have been
aware of this duty. However, since the determination of liability is based
on the realistic possibility of the officer's opportunity to take preventive
action in that situation, the facts would have to be assessed with objectivity
rather than with hindsight. Without a clear opportunity, it cannot be said
that the failure to intervene was the proximate cause of the harm
incurred. 24' For the court to determine whether or not the officers failed
to intervene in contravention of their duty to act, it would have to view the
videotape and listen to all the evidence presented.242
In addition to holding an officer personally liable, the decision in
Monell v. Department of Social Services24 3 held that a section 1983

238. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972); see Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that the duty to intervene extends to the subordinate to prevent the supervisor from using
excessive force).
239. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing the omission theory of criminal liability).
240. Compare AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 3-26.1 (declaring that the failure to intervene on
the part of any police officer present when a plaintiff's rights are being violated is a basis for liability) with
supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the omission theory of liability).
241. O'Neill v. Krzeminiski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988); see id. (finding "an affirmative duty to
intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in the officer's presence by
fellow officers").
242. King's case lends strong support to installing a video camera in all patrol cars for the purpose of
monitoring the use of excessive force in arrests. Some patrol cars have already begun using videotape evidence
in drunk-driving arrests. Vivien Lou Chen, Arresting Evidence on DWI; Camera Use Said to Raise Conviction
Rate, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1992, at Cl.
243. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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claimant has an option to file a claim and hold a municipality liable for
prospective relief and compensatory damages. 2 " In Monell, the United
States Supreme Court held that liability may be imposed upon a municipal
entity for the municipality's wrongful conduct.24 In cases where the
municipality simply employs a police officer who uses excessive force on
an arrestee, there is no liability.24 6 In other words, there is no respondeat
superior liability247 if a well-trained officer acts independently and
against departmental guidelines.248 Applying the Monell standard, the
Court in Owen v. City of Independence24 9 found that a municipal officer
acting in good faith will not protect the entity from liability in cases where
the municipality is responsible for violating the plaintiff's federally
protected rights by failing to properly train the officers." The Court
explained that the municipality must be the proximate cause of the
violation of the plaintiffs federally protected rights.25
In Walker v. City of New York, 25 2 the Second Circuit set up a threeprong test imposing liability on municipalities for failing to train or
properly supervise police officers. 53 The test requires: (1) That the
municipality have knowledge to a "moral certainty" that the officers will
encounter a certain type of situation; (2) that either (a) the circumstance
be one where there is a history of municipal misconduct, or (b) there is a
difficult choice presented that would be made easier with training or
supervision; and (3) that the situation arising out of the improper conduct
of the officer is also a constitutional violation." 4 While a municipality
meeting the requirements of this three-prong test will be held liable, it
would remain protected from judgments for punitive damages under

244. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 691-95.
247. See Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969) (defining respondeatsuperior
as a maxim providing that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant).
248. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95.
Finally, a bright glimmer of hope appears on the legislative horizon. Judge Newman of the Second
Circuit, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on May 5, 1992, urged that Section 1983
be amended to imposed [sic] direct governmental employer liability for all civil rights violations
committed by public officials under color of law, thus at long last bringing respondeat superior to
civil rights litigation. May it soon be enacted.
JOHN R. WILLIAMS, How TO HANDLE ExcEssIvE FORCE LITIGATION 25-26 (1992).
249. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
250. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53 (1980).
251. Id.
252. 974 F.2d. 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
253. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992).
254. Id.

203

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 25
section 1983 claims.255 Two on-going problems in municipal liability
actions are proving the source of the municipal policy, and proving what
the policy actually is. 6 Moreover, it remains incumbent on the plaintiff
to show that the officer used excessive force and that such force was
applied pursuant to a policy consistent with the custom or practice of the
police department.
58

C. Recommendations Made By The American Bar Association2

The American Bar Association points out that, if the prosecution elects
to dismiss charges, the alleged victim of a crime still has the right to be
5
This option allows a victim to bypass
heard before a grand jury.2
prosecutors and judges and take the case directly to the grand jury.2 °
This suggested course of action may have some application for victims
of police misconduct. However, it is a remedy available to a small number
of victims. It fails to account for those victims who do not have the
necessary means to present their case to a grand jury. An average victim's
presentation to the grand jury would consist of testimony concerning his
account of the incident. The grand jury's inquiry would then fall on the
credibility of the victim, whereas, if the District Attorney is involved, the
grand jury investigation will benefit from the resources of the district
attorney's office and will, therefore, be able to make a better informed
decision. Grand jury investigations in which the District Attorney is
involved have the benefits of the government's resources such as subpoena
powers and a trained investigatory staff, whereas an individual plaintiff
may not have the means to pay the costs of properly preparing for a grand
jury hearing. Moreover, the fact that the District Attorney, who has a duty
to prosecute, has elected not to prosecute may diminish the plaintiff's
credibility and have the effect of influencing the jurors' perception of
whether the case has merit.
The American Bar Association recommendation also fails to suggest
a means by which to screen valid claims from invalid ones. If all persons
turned away by the District Attorney made use of this direct approach, it

255.

City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258-71 (1981).

256.

WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 21.

257. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 13, at 14-35 (discussing the trial procedures under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims).
258. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-12, 3-13 (1980).
259. Id.
260. Id.
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would lead to a host of litigious claimants, many with non-meritorious
claims. The net result would be a waste of human and financial resources.
D. Recommendations Made By National DistrictAttorney's Associations
If the prosecutor's office chooses not to prosecute a police misconduct
case, the National District Attorney's Association recommends that the
evidence of the prospective case should nonetheless be presented to a
grand jury through the established guidelines of the District Attorney's
office. 6 ' Therefore, the grand jury would function as an independent

body charged with the responsibility of determining the merit or validity
of a civilian complaint of police misconduct.2 62 Then, if the grand jury
concluded that the case had merit, the District Attorney would be
compelled to prosecute the case.
This approach raises several questions: (1) Whether the grand jury
should hear all cases declined by the District Attorney or whether they
should hear only those cases which are credible; (2) who should decide the
credibility of the cases; (3) whether that decision should be appealable to
the grand jury; (4) whether the grand jury is qualified to second-guess the
District Attorney; and (5) what problems will result from this layperson
check on the judicial branch? Obviously, the absence of a mechanism to
screen valid claims from invalid ones, and the overlap between the
function of the District Attorney and the less qualified grand jurors, make
it very difficult for this suggestion to work effectively. The lack of a
proper screening device will result in a large number of grand juries
wasting court and financial resources in an effort to arrive at the same
conclusions as the District Attorney.
Analyzing overlapping evidence raises additional problems: (1) There
is a strong likelihood that the same result would repeat itself, especially
since the District Attorneys often lend credibility to witnesses (only in
cases where the District Attorney failed to bring an action because of a
conflict of interest or an error in judgment would this recommendation be
useful); and (2) the office of the District Attorney would be compromised
by second-guessing of their ability to fulfill their duties properly.

261.

NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARD, § 8.1 (1977).

262.

Jd
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E. Recommendations Made By National Advisory Commission on
CriminalJustice
When the prosecutor declines to pursue a prosecution, the National
Advisory Commission can recommend judicial review.263 This suggestion
fails to recommend what information shbuld be included to assist the judge
in making an informed determination of whether the prosecution was
correct in dismissing misconduct charges--especially if the alleged victim
goes before the grand jury without the help of the District Attorney. Again,
without a screening mechanism to separate the meritorious complaints
from the non-meritorious complaints, a host of non-meritorious claimants
would seek judicial review and the judge would, once more, be relegated
to second-guessing the District Attorney.
V. CONCLUSION

The two case studies presented were specifically chosen to show how
the problems of prosecuting police officers for police brutality and
misconduct in the courts have not been resolved. These cases demonstrate
that the problems are not restricted to a specific geographic region, but are
problems of nationwide concern. Between the two cases, there is a span of
ten years time and a geographical distance of 3,000 miles. There is a long
list of differences between the two case studies, but common to both cases
are the continued brutality of the police and prevalence of social
stereotyping.
There is an urgent need to recognize the real obstacles to investigating
and prosecuting meritorious excessive force cases. Several factors work
together to demonstrate the difficulties in prosecuting a police officer for
misconduct. These factors include, among other things: (1) The conflict of
interest that stems from the close working relationship between the District
Attorney's office and the police department, (2) social stereotyping and
stigmatization by the police and the juries, and (3) the attitude and
inadequate training of the police force. Each factor alone presents a
difficult obstacle to overcome in prosecuting police misconduct.
We are all affected by a casual approach to police misconduct. An
independent agency that is designed to investigate matters of police

263. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON
COURTS § 1.2 (1973).
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misconduct and that has the power to prosecute and punish has proven to
be inadequate. The combined efforts of an independent agency and a new
social attitude through public awareness and education will bring about
changes for stereotyped victims such as Michael Stewart and Rodney King.
Unless such changes take place, police brutality may or may not simply
continue to be labeled as misconduct and those guilty of "misconduct"
may or may not simply be reprimanded.
The inadequacies of CCRB's opened the forum on how to improve the
handling of civilian complaints of police misconduct. It has been suggested
that a state-funded administrative agency directly responsible to the
Governor be created and that this agency be equipped with a computer
database which would contain all complaints of police misconduct. 264
The information would be databased by staff attorneys, employed through
the governor's office, whose role would be to act as watchdogs over law
enforcement and to advocate victims' rights.265
A central computer database 266 would improve an agency's ability
to investigate citizen complaints and help to reduce future incidents of
police brutality, racial or otherwise. For example, when a person files a
complaint with the agency, the agency representative would be able to
input answers within a structured format designed to gather detailed,
pertinent information from the complainant. The questions should include
information similar to that contained in properly kept police files on
arrestees or pretrial detainees. 267 From the computer database, the agency
representative would be able to retrieve essential information. The
264. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially
Motivated Violence," 99 YALE LJ. 845, 855 (1990). This suggestion was originally intended for a Bias
Reporting Agency; however, it seemed well-suited for investigations dealing with police misconduct.
265. Id.
266. See Today's News Update, 209 N.Y. LJ. 1 (Apr. 27, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Newspapers File (describing New York Governor Mario Cuomo's recently proposed legislation for the creation
of a "DNA database" to assemble genetic identification profiles on convicted murderers and sex offenders, who
would be required to provide blood samples).
267. Included in police files are the following:
(1) Names, numbers, and statements of the police officers involved; (2) names, addresses, and
statements of civilian witnesses; (3) a statement of the plaintiff, if given to the police; (4) a
detective's summary of the incident; (5) various forms and reports as required by local police
regulations and practice; (6) photographs, diagrams, and memoranda relating to the physical scene;
(7) reports relating to whether medical treatment was given to the police or the plaintiff; (8) results
of police examinations, analyses, or tests on physical evidence; (9) a list of all the relevant physical
evidence seized, viewed, or photographed; (10) arrest records of witnesses and parties; (11) police
department rules or regulations pertaining to the incident in question; (12) general investigative
reports, including internal investigations of civilian complaints; (13) reports of radio calls concerning
the-incident; (14) mug shots or other photographs of the plaintiff; (15) results of polygraph tests.
AVERY & RuDovsKY, supra note 13, at 6-6.
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information would contain prior complaints of misconduct and could be
cross-referenced to contain prior complaints against a particular police
officer. The agency representative could then retrieve information on the
entire precinct or just that of an individual officer. This data might then be
dispositive of which precincts are more likely to have higher incidents of
brvitality and signal how carefully civilian complaints should be handled
at such precincts.
After further investigation, the agency representative could assess
whether or not the complaint was legitimate and whether it had merit.
With the determination that the complaint is legitimate, but that injury is
minimal, the staff attorney could determine whether the precinct should
undergo a policy change or offer mandatory courses designed to help the
officers cope with job stress. The problems in the precinct may stem from
the fact that their location is in a high-crime area and the officers are
having difficulty in coping with the problems of always being "under the
gun." On the other hand, the problem may be an individual police officer
with a tendency to use excessive force, but without clearly noticeable
injury. In such a case, the officer involved may be able to receive help
from a treatment program sponsored by the agency. Through training and
counseling, the department could help offending officers realize that they
have a moral and ethical duty owed to the arrestee and that.they must not
overlook that critical aspect of their responsibilities. These efforts could
initially be more preventive than punitive.
In a case where preventive measures have been taken and there are
continued complaints, more drastic measures must be taken. For example,
where there are a specified number of complaints, an attorney working for
the agency would become involved in the case. The agency attorney would
be trained to function as a special prosecutor in lieu of the District
Attorney's office. This independent investigatorial body would eliminate
any prejudice or bias which the District Attorney's office may have
developed through its extended interaction with law enforcement. After a
complete investigation and a determination of probable cause, the police
and the prosecutor's office would be compelled to work with the agency
attorney to cooperate in furtherance of the prosecution.
At the conclusion of an investigation, the attorney would submit a
detailed report of the findings along with possible recommendations for
disposition of the case. The agency would analyze the staff attorney's
report and determine what steps to take. The steps would range from
disciplinary measures taken against the precinct or police officer to actual
prosecution of the police officer in criminal court. The disciplinary steps
208
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would include, but would not be limited to, assignment to desk work rather
than field work, mandatory counseling, suspension, or termination of
employment. The indictment or prosecution against the police officer
would be headed by the attorneys employed at the agency and would be
assisted by the District Attorney's office.
This agency and its database of information might have made a
significant difference in the prosecution of the officers indicted for
excessive use of force in cases similar to Michael Stewart's and Rodney
King's. The agency would have had records on prior complaints against
officers involved and the agency could have then conducted an objective
investigation into the facts without allowing political pressures to sway its
actions. The agency may not have been able -to change the societal
perspective on police duty, but the agency's attorneys may have been
better equipped to perform during the stages of investigation and trial.
Finally, with an ear to the ground, we can continue to hope that:
although federal judges may increasingly be substituting their own
ideas of what is reasonable for a police officer to believe, that does
not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs have lost their battle.
Federal judges, too, can be reasoned with. Civil rights violations,
properly presented, are always offensive to any thinking person,
federal judges not excepted.268

268. WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 30. For examples of judicial efforts to determine what is reasonable
for police to believe and consequent limits on Harlow immunity, see Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348-49
(7th Cir. 1992), Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991), Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d
444, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1991).
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